Toms, StevenAlmaslukhi, Nouf2025-12-152025Almaslukhi, N. (2025). Assessing the Effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in Reducing Financial Fraud in Publicly Listed U.S. Companies. Master’s dissertation, University of Leeds.https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14154/77497This dissertation, evaluates the effectiveness of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in reducing financial fraud among U.S. publicly listed companies. Using a uniquely constructed dataset of reported fraud cases collected from the Nexis database (1986–2019), the study employs descriptive analysis, peak trend evaluation, Poisson regression, and Fisher’s Exact Tests to compare fraud incidence before and after SOX, with particular focus on sectoral variation. The findings show that SOX enhanced fraud detection rather than deterrence, with significant increases in reported cases across most sectors and considerable differences driven by accounting complexity, industry characteristics, and regulatory visibility. By analysing actual reported fraud cases rather than relying on proxy-based prediction models, this dissertation contributes new empirical evidence and highlights the need for sector-specific regulatory approaches to strengthen future fraud prevention and detection frameworks.Abstract The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was enacted to regain confidence in U.S. capital markets following major corporate scandals. Although intended to enhance transparency, internal controls, and fraud deterrence, its effectiveness remains questionable. This dissertation evaluates whether SOX reduced financial fraud in U.S. publicly listed companies, with specific attention to sectoral variation. Reported fraud cases from 1986 to 2019 were collected via the Nexis database using a Boolean search strategy and classified by industry. Descriptive analysis, peak trend comparisons, and statistical tests, including Poisson regression and Fisher’s Exact Test, were applied to evaluate changes before and after SOX. Findings show a pronounced escalation in reported fraud post-SOX, with significant increases across most sectors. This suggests SOX improved detection but did not deter fraud. Sectoral differences further indicate that a uniform regulatory approach overlooks industry-specific vulnerabilities, as fraud was most prevalent in sectors characterised by greater accounting complexity, while it was lower in strictly monitored sectors. The research contributes to the literature by moving beyond proxies of manipulation (e.g., accruals, M-scores) to analyse actual reported fraud cases. It explains that SOX’s effectiveness lies in exposure rather than prevention, and that future reforms must account for sectoral contexts. The findings also challenge whether SOX responses are genuine public-interest regulation or a symbolic political reaction to public pressure.35enManagerial ManipulationCorporate MisreportingDetection vs. DeterrenceSector-Specific Fraud DynamicsAccounting ComplexityRegulatory FactorsGovernance RegulationsInternal Controls (Section 404)Corporate Governance MechanismsLegislative Behaviour AnalysisPublic Interest vs. Private Interest TheoryIdeological Regulatory TheoryRegulatory EffectivenessFraud Detection MechanismsMedia-Reported Fraud CasesNexis Boolean Search StrategyNexis Fraud DatasetPoisson Regression AnalysisFisher’s Exact TestDescriptive Trend AnalysisFraud Peak AnalysisStatistical Modelling of Fraud IncidenceSectoral VariationIndustry-Specific VulnerabilitiesForensic Accounting MeasurementFinancial ScandalsAudit QualityReporting QualityCompliance CostsDetection BiasSelection Bias in Fraud MeasurementFinancial Regulation TheoryRegulatory CapturePolitical Economy of RegulationCapital Market ConfidenceU.S. Publicly Listed CompaniesThesis