In Between Sovereigns-The Political Economy of International Oil Concessions

dc.contributor.advisorMurtazashvili, Ilia
dc.contributor.authorSulaimani, Mohammed
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-26T05:50:57Z
dc.date.issued2024-11-13
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation develops a novel theory of oil nationalization based on insights from new institutionalism in political science and economics, arguing that high enforcement costs inherent in international oil concession agreements contribute significantly to oil nationalization. The 20th century, characterized by fragile international oil governance, saw numerous instances where international oil companies (IOCs) struggled to enforce contracts, leading to host state opportunistic behavior and ultimately nationalization. While existing scholarship offers valuable insights into the political, economic, and ideological drivers of oil nationalization, it often overlooks a crucial structural factor: the lack of third-party enforcement in international oil concession agreements. This research utilizes a case study methodology, focusing on the Aramco concession agreement with the Saudi Arabian government. Through an analysis of archival data, diplomatic correspondence and personal memoirs, the research reveals the substantial enforcement costs paid by both Aramco and the United States’ government in their efforts to maintain the concession agreement. These costs, manifesting as financial compromises, diplomatic maneuvering, and even covert operations, highlight the fragility of self-enforcing contracts in the absence of a formal third-party enforcement mechanism. The dissertation argues that nationalization emerges as a consequence of the failure to adequately address these escalating enforcement costs. Building upon these findings, the dissertation suggests future research avenues exploring other historical nationalization cases, such as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951, as well as contemporary examples such as Chinese national oil companies operating abroad. By investigating these diverse cases through the lens of enforcement costs, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics shaping international resource governance.
dc.format.extent207
dc.identifier.citationAPA
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14154/74729
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Pittsburgh
dc.subjectOil Nationalization
dc.subjectNew Institutionalism
dc.subjectEnforcement Costs
dc.subjectTransaction Costs
dc.subjectAramco
dc.subjectSaudi Arabia
dc.subjectNatural Resources Governance
dc.subjectInternaitonal Relations
dc.titleIn Between Sovereigns-The Political Economy of International Oil Concessions
dc.typeThesis
sdl.degree.departmentGraduate School of Public and International Affairs
sdl.degree.disciplineInternational Affairs
sdl.degree.grantorUniversity of Pittsburgh
sdl.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

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