Truthful aggregation of budget proposals with additive guarantees

dc.contributor.advisorGiorgios Christodoulou
dc.contributor.authorFLWA IBRAHIM ZAID ALDOSSARY
dc.date2021
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-04T19:32:29Z
dc.date.available2022-03-24 09:17:25
dc.date.available2022-06-04T19:32:29Z
dc.description.abstractIn this research, the participatory budgeting problem will be studied, in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or activities) and these proposals must be aggregated into a single aggregate division. We will depart from the single-minded setting considered by Freeman et al. [1] and their mechanisms will be implemented and experimentally analyzed for various objectives
dc.format.extent67
dc.identifier.other110584
dc.identifier.urihttps://drepo.sdl.edu.sa/handle/20.500.14154/66229
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSaudi Digital Library
dc.titleTruthful aggregation of budget proposals with additive guarantees
dc.typeThesis
sdl.degree.departmentBig Data and High Performance Computing
sdl.degree.grantorUniversity of Liverpool
sdl.thesis.levelMaster
sdl.thesis.sourceSACM - United Kingdom

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