Truthful aggregation of budget proposals with additive guarantees
dc.contributor.advisor | Giorgios Christodoulou | |
dc.contributor.author | FLWA IBRAHIM ZAID ALDOSSARY | |
dc.date | 2021 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-04T19:32:29Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-03-24 09:17:25 | |
dc.date.available | 2022-06-04T19:32:29Z | |
dc.description.abstract | In this research, the participatory budgeting problem will be studied, in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or activities) and these proposals must be aggregated into a single aggregate division. We will depart from the single-minded setting considered by Freeman et al. [1] and their mechanisms will be implemented and experimentally analyzed for various objectives | |
dc.format.extent | 67 | |
dc.identifier.other | 110584 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://drepo.sdl.edu.sa/handle/20.500.14154/66229 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Saudi Digital Library | |
dc.title | Truthful aggregation of budget proposals with additive guarantees | |
dc.type | Thesis | |
sdl.degree.department | Big Data and High Performance Computing | |
sdl.degree.grantor | University of Liverpool | |
sdl.thesis.level | Master | |
sdl.thesis.source | SACM - United Kingdom |