A SIMULATION OF AN EMV TRANSACTION AND A NO-PIN ATTACK AGAINST IT

Abstract

The EMV (Europay, MasterCard, and Visa) standard, which is commonly used for card transactions globally, is thoroughly examined in this dissertation. Starting with the purpose and motivation for the study, it examines the history of the EMV system and describes its structure by explaining the four EMV books that cover topics ranging from security to interface specifications. The study deconstructs the protocol phases and reveals potential weaknesses by looking at different attack strategies, including the replay attack, fallback attack, and, most significantly, the no-PIN attack. Understanding EMV transactions, an the No-PIN Attack, are the main objectives of this study. The methodology used entails choosing particular hardware, software, and simulation-related procedures. The research suggests a thorough lesson plan to facilitate learning that includes both theoretical and practical sessions with the goal of giving participants a solid understanding of EMV transactions, its weaknesses, and practical experience of the No-PIN attack. Using components such as the Raspberry Pi Pico and the RFID Reader/Writer MFRC522, the study’s practical aspect is demonstrated. By the end, participants should be able to not only understand the complexities of EMV transactions but also critically assess their understanding and effectively express it. The study comes to a conclusion by evaluating the results and listing the key conclusions.