The Political Drivers of the Decline of Multilateralism: A Critical Analysis of Strategic Shifts Toward Bilateralism in Contemporary Global Governance

Abstract

ABSTRACT The global shift from multilateralism to bilateralism in international cooperation is not merely a strategic realignment but a politically motivated transformation driven by nationalist resurgence, populist governance, and intensified geopolitical rivalry. This dissertation investigates the political causes behind the observable decline in multilateral cooperation frameworks, such as the WTO and TPP, and the corresponding rise of bilateral agreements. It argues that states are not abandoning multilateralism due to functional inefficiencies alone, but because of deliberate political choices shaped by domestic ideological shifts, electoral pressures, and recalibrated national security priorities. The central hypothesis asserts that bilateralism offers greater sovereignty, immediacy, and political payoffs, especially under populist or nationalist regimes seeking to maximize domestic legitimacy. This study addresses a critical gap in existing scholarship. While previous studies have explored the outcomes of bilateralism or the institutional failures of multilateralism (Knio, 2022; Ruggie, 1993), few have engaged with the political causality that underpins the shift across diverse sectors. Most notably, literature tends to isolate economic reasoning while underestimating the strategic political narratives that delegitimize collective mechanisms. This dissertation, therefore, provides a comparative political analysis, rooted in international relations theory (realism, institutionalism, and constructivism), to explain why states strategically abandon multilateral platforms even when they offer long-term benefits. Using a qualitative, comparative case study design, the dissertation applies Mill’s Method of Difference and process-tracing techniques to three illustrative cases: the US–China trade war, the US withdrawal from the TPP, and the Abraham Accords in the Middle East. These cases span trade, economic governance, and security diplomacy, offering a cross-sectoral examination of political motivations. Evidence includes treaties, government statements, electoral campaign data, and multilateral institutional records. For instance, the Trump administration’s 2017 exit from the TPP was justified through populist rhetoric aimed at restoring "economic nationalism" (Haggard, 2020), while the Abraham Accords reflected a bypass of long-standing multilateral peace initiatives in favor of U.S.-mediated bilateralism driven by regional power realignment (Yossef, 2022). Findings reveal that political logic increasingly supersedes economic efficiency, and states view multilateralism as incompatible with their short-term political agendas. The erosion of multilateral trust, combined with the rise of transactional diplomacy, indicates a systemic shift in global governance. This research contributes to international relations theory by providing empirical evidence that populist regimes exploit bilateralism to sidestep multilateral accountability, confirming realist and institutionalist predictions under new global dynamics. Finally, this dissertation provides a theory-informed, evidence-based, and politically informed understanding of the decline of multilateralism. It provides an academic contribution to and policy-relevant analysis of the course of international cooperation in a time characterized by ideological disintegration and competitive nationalism.