The principle (or the notion) of accountable judiciary (or holding judges to account): A comparative study of Saudi Arabia and the U.K. (or English) Laws.

Abstract

This thesis undertakes a comparative administrative‐law examination of judicial independence in two advanced legal systems—England & Wales and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—while emphasising the latter’s visionary governance and commitment to both de jure guarantees and de facto implementation. Drawing on formalist, functionalist, and sociological theories, it develops a dual framework that distinguishes between de jure (statutory and constitutional guarantees) and defacto (institutional practice and administrative behaviour) indicators of independence. These indicators encompass tenure security, appointment procedures, financial autonomy, disciplinary safeguards, and protection from improper influence. The framework is applied through rigorous doctrinal analysis of primary legislation, soft‐law instruments, and observed administrative practice. In the UK case (Chapters 2–3), the thesis traces the administrative evolution from the Act of Settlement (1701) to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. It demonstrates how de jure measures—such as the Judicial Appointments Commission’s merit‐based selection process, consolidated‐fund remuneration, and entrenched tenure protections—combine with de facto conventions—Parliamentary restraint in commenting on pending cases and media‐court protocols—to reinforce a principled separation of powers. These administrative safeguards ensure that English and Welsh judges operate with predictable funding, protected status, and clear recusal and contempt procedures that shield them from executive or legislative interference. Chapters 4–6 celebrate Saudi Arabia’s dynamic fusion of centuries‐old Sharīʿah principles with cutting‐edge administrative‐law reforms under the Kingdom’s enlightened leadership. The analysis charts the system’s progression from early qāḍī and maẓālim forums to the 1992 Basic Law of Governance and the 2007 Judiciary Law, which enshrine Article 46’s de jure guarantee of judicial independence. It then examines de facto innovations: the Supreme Judicial Council’s transparent recruitment and promotion protocols, tiered rank hierarchies with probationary safeguards, specialised commercial and administrative tribunals, e‐litigation platforms that expedite case management, and Nazaha’s pioneering anti‐corruption oversight. These measures collectively reflect the regime’s unwavering commitment to administrative transparency, accountability, and the continuous enhancement of public trust.

Chapter7 synthesises these findings by contrasting England and Wales’s long‐tested administrative safeguards with Saudi Arabia’s model of tradition‐empowered reform. It offers six targeted administrative‐law recommendations—mandatory annual anonymised reporting on judicial appointments, disciplinary measures, and budget allocations; statutory limits on executive review powers; and routine publication of written judgments—to strengthen de jure frameworks and deepen de facto autonomy. By demonstrating how a modern administrative structure can harmonise with Sharīʿah values under enlightened stewardship, this work provides best‐practice benchmarks for any jurisdiction committed to an impartial, accountable judiciary operating within a robust separation‐of‐powers framework.