State-Owned Enterprises and Competition Law in the GCC: Challenges to a Unified Regulatory Framework

Abstract

This dissertation examines the treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under competition law in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and evaluates the feasibility of establishing a unified regional framework. Despite the growing economic role of SOEs across GCC states, national competition regimes remain fragmented in their approach to SOEs, creating risks of regulatory inconsistency, market distortion, and competitive inequality.

Adopting a doctrinal and comparative methodology, the dissertation analyses the competition laws of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. It identifies four dominant regulatory models governing SOE exemptions: sovereign exclusion, mandate-based exemption, designation-based exemption, and public-facility functions. The analysis demonstrates that broad sovereign exemptions, particularly where linked to public ownership rather than functional necessity, generate structural imbalances between public and private market actors and weaken effective enforcement.

The study evaluates existing GCC economic integration efforts and assesses whether full legal harmonisation or soft regulatory convergence provides a more viable pathway toward alignment. It argues that immediate binding harmonisation is politically and institutionally unrealistic. Instead, the dissertation proposes a soft-first convergence model based on transparency, narrow functional exemptions, competitive neutrality principles, and gradual institutional coordination between national authorities.

The dissertation concludes that meaningful GCC competition integration in relation to SOEs is achievable only through incremental coordination rather than formal unification. By refining SOE exemption standards and strengthening enforcement cooperation, GCC states can enhance market fairness while preserving legitimate public-interest functions.