Non-Compliance with International Court Judgments and Arbitral Awards: An Analytical Study

Abstract

International dispute resolution rests on an expectation of compliance with court judgments and arbitral awards, yet in practice compliance is sometimes partial or absent. This dissertation asks a straightforward question: why does implementation falter, and what would make compliance more likely? It situates the problem in two main settings: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and investor–state arbitration under the ICSID Convention with selective reference to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Methodologically, it combines doctrinal analysis and close reading of institutional rules (including UN Charter Article 94(2) and ICSID Articles 53–55) with targeted case studies such as Nicaragua v United States (1986) and Micula v Romania (2013/2017), alongside a comparative look at domestic enforcement practice. The study finds that legal finality alone does not secure performance. At the ICJ, follow-up runs through the Security Council, where a veto can stall collective action. By contrast, under ICSID, recognition is strong but execution turns on sovereign-immunity law and the location of commercial state assets. Across forums, outcomes hinge on incentives, administrative capacity, and the domestic uptake of norms. The dissertation concludes with practical proposals: clearer statutory gateways for recognition and asset discovery, routine and transparent compliance reporting, and a calibrated mix of sanctions and incentives that lowers the legal and political cost of performance—and makes compliance the easier choice. D