Corruption, Accounting and Investment

Abstract

Corruption poses a significant threat to economic development by eroding investor confidence, deterring foreign direct investment (FDI) and weakening institutional quality. A growing body of literature suggests that improving governance structures, such as accounting standards and investor protection, can help mitigate corruption. This research explores the relationships between corruption, accounting, protection of minority investors (PMI), and investment through a systematic literature review (SLR) and empirical investigations.

Chapter One outlines the research objectives, contributions, and key gaps in the literature. It introduces the concept of corruption, including its definitions, types, and anti-corruption measures. This provides the foundation for subsequent chapters linking governance tools to corruption control and investment outcomes.

Chapter Two presents a systematic literature review (SLR) of studies published between 2000 and 2023, sourced from Scopus using keywords related to ‘Accounting’, ‘Auditing’ and ‘Corruption’. It examines how corruption relates to accounting, identifies recurring themes and gaps, and builds a solid foundation for the existing literature. The findings highlight international accounting and auditing standards, accounting education, accounting and audit quality, internal and external auditor roles, professional accounting bodies and New Public Management (NPM) as key mechanisms in combating corruption. However, the literature reveals inconsistencies in their effectiveness across institutional contexts, providing a strong foundation for the following empirical chapters.

Chapter Three extends the investigation by empirically examining the relationship between PMI and corruption using data from 185 countries (2006-2018). Although PMI is negatively and significantly associated with perceived corruption, the analysis unexpectedly reveals a positive and significant relationship between PMI and actual experiences of corruption and bribery, suggesting that corporate insiders, i.e. directors, may strategically use informal payments to enhance firm value or signal stronger investor protection. The rule of law moderates this relationship. These findings are interpreted using several theories, such as management hegemony, stewardship, the hidden cost of bribery, and coordination game and bribery theory.

Chapter Four examines whether PMI and accounting standards moderate the relationship between corruption and FDI, using panel data from 133 countries (2006-2017) with OLS and two-step GMM estimations. Findings indicate that stronger PMI or accounting standards can mitigate the negative effect of corruption on FDI, supporting agency theory.

This research contributes to the literature on corporate governance and corruption by combining conceptual, review-based, and empirical insights. It highlights the importance of accounting and investor protection in addressing corruption, and attracting investment, offering practical guidance for policymakers, regulators, managers, investors, business leaders and researchers in promoting better governance and economic growth.