Shades of Agency Problem on FTSE techmarket index's firms and CEOs Compensation

Abstract

The thesis attempts to identify the correlation between CEO remunerations and firm performance under optimal contract theories in FTSE techmarket index’s firms between 2014 to 2018. The main reason of this research is to identify the relationship between the CEO and the firms under the agency theory, because the level of remunerations is a dilemma, while firms attempt to attract a CEO, the rewards should be sufficient to mitigate mangers self-interest at the same time to avoid the extreme increase. However, decreasing managerial intensive could lead to declining performance, as the increase may lead to inflation in the economy. Therefore, the main research goal is to shed light on the FTSE techmarket index firms, because the high-tech firms have long-term performance (Brealey et al,2011). Moreover, they may require controlling by high experienced CEOs.