To what extent has Zambia pursued hedging in its relations with the Western democracies and the People's Republic of China?

Abstract

The rise of the People’s Republic of China, the challenge this presents to the hegemonic Western democracies of Europe and North America, and the implications for small and medium powers in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, is a topic of major international significance. In turn, hedging has been identified as a valuable concept, particularly in the context of Southeast and East Asia, that can help explain the strategies adopted by small and medium powers in the face of an increasingly uncertain and multipolar world. Logic suggests that, as China goes global, so will the strategies small/medium powers adopt in response. Africa—a continent of resource-rich, non-aligned developing states—seems well suited to hedging strategies. However, little research has thus far focused on hedging in Africa, with no studies focusing on hedging in Zambia in particular. This, therefore, is the rationale for the current research. Following a literature review which locates this study in its wider research context, in the process of developing an understanding of both hedging and Zambian foreign relations, an analysis is conducted of the extent to which Zambia has pursued hedging in its relations with the Western democracies and PRC. The evidence shows that, across the identified domains and despite changes in regime, from independence in 1964 to the present day, Zambia has pursued a risk-management/opportunity-maximisation non-alignment strategy, which consistently meets multiple indicators of hedging (including not taking sides and cultivating fallback options with diverse partners). This leads to the conclusion that Zambia has—and continues—to hedge in its relations with the West and China.