Power, Survival, and the Bomb: Realist Theories and the Divergence of Israeli and Iranian Nuclear Strategy (2003-2025)

Abstract

This dissertation examines how Israel and Iran’s nuclear postures from 2003 to 2025 can be explained through competing strands of realist theory. It argues that Israel’s approach reflects Sagan’s pessimistic model, rooted in assumptions of irrational adversaries and unstable proliferation environments, while Iran’s trajectory is more consistent with Glaser’s defensive realism, privileging regime preservation, deterrence, and calibrated restraint. By juxtaposing these perspectives, the study demonstrates how divergent realist logics generate a persistent security dilemma that fuels cycles of alarmism, pre-emptive denial, and retaliatory escalation. Using theory-testing process tracing, the analysis identifies three empirical phases—diplomatic engagement (2003–2011), strategic recalibration (2012–2015), and offensive entanglement (2016–2025)—each examined through Critical Points of Observation (CPOs) that illuminate how Israel and Iran operationalised their nuclear strategies. Key events include Netanyahu’s 2012 UN “red line” speech, the 2015 JCPOA and its contested aftermath, the U.S. withdrawal and “maximum pressure” campaign, and Israel’s escalation to covert operations and pre-emptive strikes. The findings contribute to debates on nuclear proliferation by showing how realist theories not only interpret state behaviour but also interact in practice: Sagan’s pessimism legitimises Israel’s offensive realist posture, while Glaser’s defensive realism clarifies Iran’s preference for hedging and survival. This dual reading underscores the explanatory power of realism in capturing the asymmetric dynamics of Middle East nuclear politics.