Maritime Security Decision Support System Based on Game Theory and Case-specific Analysis
Abstract
For so many decades, maritime transportation represented the backbone of global trade and has
always been one of the most important political dominance means. In recent years, the world
became more reliant on global trade and more demand is observed on under seabed crude oil and
natural gas. Furthermore, direct and indirect warfare and political and military dominance take
place in strategic waterways of significance to marine navigation. This research aims to; design
and develops a Decision Support System that accounts for ship-specific inputs in terms of ships'
identity, manoeuvrability, and approach. And reflect that on the Game Theory application to
produce strategic countermeasure plan.
The research focused on four areas; maritime transportation system, multi-attribute decisionmaking, game theory, and maritime surveillance. The research identified the gap between applying
generic decision-making systems based on rigid regulatory guidelines, and the processing of casespecific characteristics exhibited by identified marine threat (e.g. piracy, smuggling, terrorism).
Another gap identified through literature critical review in relevant research areas; is that the
common solutions presented in maritime security-related decision-making do not follow a strategic
approach. Hence, game theory is utilized to present the user with a strategic countermeasure plan
to neutralize identified threats.
The methodology developed for this research began with collecting relevant data from Jeddah
Port, King Abdullah Port, Saudi Arabia Coast Guards, and Saudi Arabia Naval Forces. That data
is used to build users' preference structure (i.e. decision-making logic of users) and establish a
relationship between threat ships' various attributes. Next, the framework modelled to process
threat ships' information (inputs) to find out its' identity score, manoeuvrability characteristics and
approaching condition to nearby critical infrastructure; using novel analysis that depicts interrelation among various attributes.
The model then takes those three scores, and use them to transform the game theory matrix, using
a novel algorithm, from its' generic to its' case-specific form. Lastly, a modified version of IEDS
is applied to produce a security countermeasure plan; specifically tailored for the identified threat
ship. The model framework was applied on three real distinctive cases; (1) highjacked oil product
tanker targeting port facility, (2) Container vessel encountered piracy overtaking attempt, and
finally (3) a VLCC arrested and detained for engaging in smuggling activity to the sanctioned
facility. As the model produced countermeasure plans relevant to each of those cases, the outputs
were validated by domain experts.
Subsequently, model-produced countermeasure plans were discussed and efficient in loss/damage
mitigation and threat deterrence. Those countermeasure plans did not go strictly by the common
code of practice but were mainly focused on choosing strategies that yield highest payoffs, or
scored lower loss, against expected threat actions. The models' outputs quality could have been
further enhanced; larger datasets added probabilistic and automation functions. Moreover, the
model could have incorporated shipboard protocols to be useful for seafarers encountering
maritime threat while at sea.